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This paper provides some explanation of recent fiscal developments in European countries and offers several 
guidelines for a new European fiscal framework. We propose a framework based on three pillars: a quantitatively and 
qualitatively extended preventive arm, an improved dissuasive arm and a financial arm that facilitates financial 
solidarity between member states, thus increasing the credibility of the euro area.
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     1.  Introduction 
 
Since 1997, the European Union’s fiscal framework has been defined by the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). This framework, which was revised in 2005,  builds  on the 
Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. The SGP was established to safeguard sound public 
finances. The Pact consists of a preventive arm  and a dissuasive arm. Under the 
provisions of the preventive arm, member  states must submit annual stability or 
convergence programs showing how they intend to achieve or safeguard sound fiscal 
positions in the medium term, taking into account the impending budgetary impact of 
population aging. On the basis of a proposal by the Commission, the Council can issue an 
early warning to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit. The dissuasive part of the 
Pact governs the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). The EDP is triggered when deficits 
breach 3% of GDP, the threshold of the Treaty. If it is determined that the deficit is 
excessive, as defined in the Treaty, the Council issues recommendations to the member 
states for correcting the excessive deficit. It also provides a timeframe for doing so. Non-
compliance with the recommendations triggers further steps, including the possibility of 
sanctions against member states. 
 
Despite this framework, fiscal developments in most European countries show a strong 
increase of the public balance and the public debt ratios from 2008. In 2009, the public 
balance and public debt in the EU increased by 4.5 points of GDP and 12 points of GDP, 
respectively. Moreover, the Greek government had difficulties financing its debt, which 
led to the creation of a rescue package. Recent fiscal developments highlight weaknesses 
in the current framework. Consequently, there is an ongoing debate about the future of 
European governance. On one hand, the SGP should be strengthened; on the other hand, 
the framework should provide for increased coordination in economic policies.    
 
The aim of this paper is to provide some explanation of recent fiscal developments in 
European countries and to offer guidelines for a new European fiscal framework. The 
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents recent fiscal developments, Section 3 
analyzes the responses of the current fiscal framework, Section 4 discusses several views 
of the future European governance and proposes a revision of the Pact, and the final 
section concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.  The European public finance in the crisis 
 
2.1. A single destiny 
 
Before the current crisis hit European economies, European public finances were 
experiencing a period of fiscal consolidation. The public balance in the euro area had 
been reduced by 2.5 percentage points of GDP since 2003 and had almost reached 
equilibrium in 2007 (-0.6% of GDP). Similarly, the ratio of public debt had declined by 
4.1 pp over the same period to 70.9% of GDP. However, fiscal consolidation was largely 
made possible by a good economic situation, and the improvement in the structural 
balance was lower than expected (Fig 1). The economic crisis led to a sharp deterioration in public finances (the public deficit in 
the euro area increased by 4.1 pp in 2009. Fiscal revenues contracted sharply due to the 
decline of tax bases (income, profit, consumption, and so on). Therefore, the increase in 
the deficit is mainly due to the automatic stabilizers: the cyclical component of the 
balance decreased by 2.6 pp in 2009 in the euro area. In addition, many European 
countries implemented discretionary measures to support economic growth. These 
measures, coordinated in the European Recovery Plan, should respect the 3T rule 
(Timely, Targeted, Temporary). The magnitude of the recovery plans was approximately 
1.2% of GDP, which explains much of the change in structural balances. Another factor 
contributing to this change is the existence of revenue shortfalls.  Revenue shortfalls 
correspond to revenue growth below what would normally be expected given legislative 
changes and by the development of macroeconomic variables used to proxy for tax bases. 
These  recent significant shortfalls are mainly linked to financial and housing market 
developments (Morris et al., 2009). 
 
                                       Fig 1. Public finances in the Euro area (% GDP) 
-8,0 
-7,0 
-6,0 
-5,0 
-4,0 
-3,0 
-2,0 
-1,0 
0,0 
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
1
9
9
2
 
 
1
9
9
3
 
 
1
9
9
4
 
 
1
9
9
5
 
 
1
9
9
6
 
 
1
9
9
7
 
 
1
9
9
8
 
 
1
9
9
9
 
 
2
0
0
0
 
 
2
0
0
1
 
 
2
0
0
2
 
 
2
0
0
3
 
 
2
0
0
4
 
 
2
0
0
5
 
 
2
0
0
6
 
 
2
0
0
7
 
 
2
0
0
8
 
 
2
0
0
9
 
 
2
0
1
0
 
 
2
0
1
1
 
 
Public debt (l.scale) Public balance (r.scale)  
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
1
9
9
2
 
 
1
9
9
3
 
 
1
9
9
4
 
 
1
9
9
5
 
 
1
9
9
6
 
 
1
9
9
7
 
 
1
9
9
8
 
 
1
9
9
9
 
 
2
0
0
0
 
 
2
0
0
1
 
 
2
0
0
2
 
 
2
0
0
3
 
 
2
0
0
4
 
 
2
0
0
5
 
 
2
0
0
6
 
 
2
0
0
7
 
 
2
0
0
8
 
 
2
0
0
9
 
 
2
0
1
0
 
 
2
0
1
1
 
 
Structural balance Cyclical component  
                                    Source : OECD, EO 86 
 
It follows that the deterioration of fiscal balances in Europe reflects the output shortfall 
and the use of fiscal policy to support growth. Hence, current fiscal deficits should not be 
considered as “indicators of pre-crisis public finance structural imbalances that should 
be cured by restrictive fiscal policies” (Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2010). 
 
As in all European countries, public finances in Greece have dramatically worsened 
during the crisis. In 2009, the public deficit reached 12.7% of GDP, and public debt 
reached 115% of GDP. The level of the Greek deficit is certainly high, but it is 
comparable to deficits  in Ireland and  the United Kingdom. However, Greek public 
finances have posed a special problem. 
 
2.2. The Greek issue 
 
Public finances in Greece have several particularities in comparison to other European 
countries. One distinguishing feature is the revision of public accounts. Since Greece 
joined the euro area, its public deficit figures have been revised several times. In 2009, 
the revision was both qualitatively and quantitatively different from previous revisions. 
The new government elected in October 2009 disclosed that that the budget deficit was estimated at 12.7% of GDP instead of the previously estimated 6.7% of GDP. This gap 
could be explained by the use of securitization deals, which  are structured finance 
products. Financial risk is distributed by aggregating debt instruments into a pool, and 
new securities are issued by this pool. Greece had classified these deals as sales of assets 
instead of loans. Thus, the deals were not included in the national accounts. Another 
feature of Greek public finance is the nation’s persistent structural deficit. Its cyclically 
adjusted primary balance has been negative since 2003. This situation is explained by two 
factors: the development of a large public sector, especially the public wage bill
1
Due to its high public deficit and interest charges (4.5% of GDP in 2009), the financing 
needs of Greece for the year 2010 are substantial (60 billion €). In the context of a 
negative economic growth rate and a positive interest rate, financing needs are subject to 
a snowball effect (i.e., the public debt is will continue to increase exponentially. Such an 
effect is not surprising in times of recession. Although  it occurs in most European 
countries, the extent of this effect in Greece is much greater than in other euro area 
countries. In Greece, the spread between the primary balance and the debt stabilizing 
primary balance
, and a 
large underground economy (28% of GDP according to the World Bank). 
 
2
 
 was equal to 12.5% of GDP in 2009, while it was 7.4% of GDP in the 
euro area as a whole (Table 1). Thus, the situation of public finances in Greece is 
perceived as a source of uncertainty by financial markets. Rating agencies downgraded 
its sovereign rating, which signaled the possibility of default. Consequently, the market 
premium for Greek bonds increased;  the yield spread between bonds issued by the 
German and Greek Governments widened to 614 basis points on April 26, 2010 (Fig 2). 
 
Table 1. Primary balance and debt stabilizing primary balance 
in the euro area in 2009 (% GDP) 
AU  BE  FI  FR  GE  GR  IR  IT  LU  NL  PT  SP  EA 
PB  -2.1  -2.1  -2.8  -5.3  -0.9  -8.2  -11.6  -0.6  -2.9  -2.7  -3.9  -8.5  -3.4 
DSPB  4.9  6.0  2.2  4.4  5.9  4.3  8.9  8.5  0.3  3.5  -0.9  3.4  4.1 
Spread  6.9  8.1  5.0  9.7  6.8  12.5  19.5  9.1  3.2  6.2  3.0  11.9  7.5 
PB: primary balance, DSPN: debt stabilizing primary balance 
Source: OECD and author’s computations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1 The growth of the public wage bill in Greece increased from 10.5% in 2000 to 11.5% in 2008, whereas the 
growth of the public wage bill in the euro area decreased from 10.5% to 10% during the same period. 
2  Debt stabilizing primary balances are computed as follows: dspb = [(r-g)/(1+g)]b  where  r  is the apparent 
interest rate, g is the economic growth rate, and b is the public debt ratio. Fig 2. Government Bond Spreads (basis points) 
 
 
 
3. The response of the current framework 
 
Given the sharp deterioration in public finances, the European Commission applied the 
SGP, which resulted in the excessive deficit procedure (EDP). The Commission 
submitted 24 of the 27 EU countries to the EDP (Table 2). Most European countries are 
outside the fiscal framework, which leads us to think that this framework is not entirely 
appropriate. The increase in European deficits is the result of a negative aggregate shock 
and not the result of individual fiscal slippage. The EDP, as it is currently defined, does 
not distinguish between these two very different situations. The Commission has applied 
the SGP with some flexibility, setting deadlines for bringing down public deficits that are 
longer (2012 or 2014) than one year. Nevertheless, the Commission declared that 
consolidation should start in 2011 at the latest and go beyond the benchmark of 0.5% of 
GDP per year. The issue is that these consolidation requests and deadlines are constraints 
imposed independently of economic developments. Thus, the consolidation requirements 
should be revised, up or down, according to the economic growth rate. 
 
In response to the Greek crisis, the EU reacted effectively and made a major coordinated 
effort to ensure the viability of the euro area. In May 2010, member states approved a 
rescue plan. The financial plan offered110 bn € to Greece over three years, with member 
states contributing 80 bn € and the IMF expected to provide the additional funding. The 
plan consisted of bilateral loans between member countries and Greece at rates below 
market rates but higher than refinancing rates. The European mechanism was also based 
on a “stabilization fund”. This fund could contain up to of 750 bn €; the IMF could 
provide 220 bn €, the EU would contribute 440 bn €, and the other 70 bn € would be 
available if member states experienced “exceptional occurrences” beyond their control. 
This Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) could offer loans or advances to member states until 
30 June 2013. The particularity of this SPV is that it could borrow with the guarantee of 
16 members, which would allow for financing at a lower rate. 
 
 Table 2. Overview of ongoing EDP 
Country  Commission report  Council Decision  Deadline 
Bulgaria  12 May 2010     
Denmark  12 May 2010     
Cyprus  12 May 2010     
Luxembourg  12 May 2010     
Finland  12 May 2010     
Austria  7 October 2009  2 December 2009  2013 
Belgium  7 October 2009  2 December 2009  2012 
Czech Republic  7 October 2009  2 December 2009  2013 
Germany  7 October 2009  2 December 2009  2013 
Italy  7 October 2009  2 December 2009  2012 
The Netherlands  7 October 2009  2 December 2009  2013 
Portugal  7 October 2009  2 December 2009  2013 
Slovenia  7 October 2009  2 December 2009  2013 
Slovakia  7 October 2009  2 December 2009  2013 
Poland  13 May 2009  7 July 2009  2012 
Romania  13 May 2009  7 July 2009  2012 
Lithuania  13 May 2009  7 July 2009  2012 
Malta  13 May 2009  7 July 2009  2011 
France  18 February 2009  27 April 2009  2013 
Latvia  18 February 2009  7 July 2009  2012 
Ireland  18 February 2009  27 April 2009  2014 
Greece  18 February 2009  27 April 2009  2014 
Spain  18 February 2009  27 April 2009  2013 
UK  11 June 2008  8 July 2008  2014 
Hungary  12 May 2004  5 July 2004  2011 
Source: European Commission 
 
 
4. Toward a new fiscal framework? 
 
There is a consensus on the necessity of improving the Pact. However, there are two 
opposing views on the appropriate direction for the future.  One is based on a 
strengthened SGP, while the other is based on increased flexibility. We believe that there 
is an intermediate option that takes European financial relations into account. 
 
4.1. A strengthened framework 
 
Most international institutions have the same position: the SGP should be strengthened. 
According to the IMF (2010), advanced economies should return to pre-crisis debt levels 
because there could be a link between the public debt level and the real interest rate level. 
OECD (2010) has called for tightening fiscal policies (by 1% of GDP per year from 2012 
to 2017) to avoid Ricardian behavior on the part of households and to reassure financial 
markets. From the German perspective, the current fiscal developments show that the SGP was not 
strict enough. Therefore, Bofinger and Ried (2010) have  proposed  a European 
Consolidation Pact to supplement the SGP. Under this consolidation pact, members are 
obliged to detail a path towards balancing their budget, and they must implement an 
automatic tax increase law in case they stray from the defined path. Moreover, the 
soundness of fiscal policies must be monitored before and after each new government 
bond issue to obtain bond guarantees.  
 
4.2. A flexible framework 
 
A strengthened framework implies two main risks for European countries. First, it could 
imply “an Argentine risk”: the implementation of restrictive policies could lead to a long 
period of slow economic growth. Moreover, there is a risk to long-term competitiveness; 
fiscal austerity leads European countries to reduce growth-enhancing public expenditures 
(R&D, education, green economy). 
 
According to the flexible view, the fiscal framework should be based on the coordination 
of economic policies. Fiscal coordination appears to be compatible with the SGP, and 
coordination gains can actually be enhanced by the SGP (Schalck, 2006). The OECD also 
recommends the coordination of fiscal strategies, but such coordination is not possible if 
all countries have to consolidate at the same time. In a deeper way, SGP rules could be 
replaced by a coordinating process that takes economic circumstances into account 
(Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 2010). 
 
4.3. Inclusion of monetary and financial issues 
 
Several proposals have been made to improve debt monitoring in Europe. Gros and 
Mayer (2010) proposed a European Monetary Fund. A country with a public debt above 
60% of GDP and/or with a public deficit higher than 3% of GDP would be expected to 
contribute. A country in difficulty could borrow an amount corresponding to its past 
contribution. To obtain more, the country would have to accept an adjustment program. 
The distinction between debt below 60% of GDP and debt above 60% of GDP is also 
present in the proposal of Delpla and von Weizäcker (2010). The debt below the 60% 
threshold debt is called “blue debt”, and it is collectively issued and guaranteed. On the 
other hand, debt over the 60% threshold is called “red debt”, and it is issued with a higher 
interest rate to discourage excessive public borrowing. 
 
Yves Leterme proposed a European Debt Agency (EDA), which would issue debt for all 
countries. Diev and Laurent (2010) analyzed a model in which an agency would issue 
eurobonds and re-lend to participating countries. These eurobonds would have a 
Guarantee Fund supplied by the most risky countries, and a decision-making body would 
determine the price to be paid by the risky countries for the guarantee. However, this 
mechanism has significant drawbacks, including loss of contact with financial markets, 
lack of transparency, and political pressure. If the aim of the mechanism is to solve 
liquidity problems for EMU members, common eurobonds would be enough. The interest rates that each government would have to pay for the bond should be exactly the rate that 
it pays on its national bonds (De Grauwe and Moesen, 2009). 
 
4.4. A three pillar fiscal framework 
 
Owing to past fiscal developments and the economic analysis above, we propose a reform 
of the SGP to improve cohesion and stability in Europe. This proposal is built around 
three pillars: a preventive arm, a dissuasive arm and a financial arm. 
 
The preventive arm should be extended quantitatively and qualitatively. The Greek crisis 
demonstrated the need for repeated rigorous examinations of statistics. Therefore, the 
harmonization of statistics and auditing by European and independent institutions should 
continue. To maintain room to maneuver during downturn periods, it is necessary that the 
SGP be symmetric. Fiscal policy should include adjustments in good times and not only 
fiscal impulses in bad times. Moreover, public investment should not be a target for 
spending cuts when  ensuring  long-term growth. Thus, the economic cycle should be 
taken into account by focusing on structural balance without public investment. Finally, 
the financial crisis has shown that the main challenge for fiscal policy is less the public 
deficit than the public debt. The Pact should be more focused on this variable. In 
addition, Ireland and Spain have shown that macroeconomic analysis should be based on 
a global analysis of debt; it should include not only public debt but also internal and 
external debt. The savings-investment balance of each country should be considered. The 
lack of private savings can impose as much pressure on interest rates in the euro area as 
the lack of public savings. Moreover, if we consider the euro as a common good, it makes 
sense to target the external balance. 
 
The dissuasive arm should be deepened. Aside from the reputation effect for the 
government, the sanctions in the EDP form a binary system: financial penalty or not. The 
corrective arm can be improved by incorporating gradual sanctions, such as the reduction 
of structural funds, suspended  voting rights, or  financial penalty. The application of 
different types and levels of sanctions would enhance the credibility of the framework. 
 
The recent crisis has shown the importance of monetary and financial responses to crises. 
Thus, it appears necessary to introduce these aspects in the fiscal framework. The SPV 
could be maintained beyond 2013 in order to show financial solidarity between member 
states and thus increase the credibility of the euro area. As noted above, sovereign risk 
premiums can be controlled in part through common bonds because they reduce liquidity 
risk. Finally, a European rating agency could be created. This agency would specialize in 
controlling sovereign risk, it would have deeper knowledge of the specific features of 
public finances,  and  it  would  reduce  the risk of self-fulfilling situations (and thus 
speculation). 
 
 
 
 
 5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has provided some explanation of the recent fiscal developments in European 
countries and offered several  guidelines for a new European fiscal framework. Most 
European countries have experienced significant increases in the public balance and the 
public debt ratio, but the deterioration of fiscal balances in Europe reflects the output 
shortfall during the recession and the use of fiscal policy to support growth. The Greek 
situation highlights the need for pan-European coordination, which has thus far only led 
to temporary mechanisms. Even if there is a consensus on the necessity of improvements 
in the Pact, there is no consensus about its future direction. Some proposals focus on 
strengthening the SGP, while others are based on increased flexibility. We propose an 
intermediate option based on three pillars: a quantitatively and qualitatively extended 
preventive arm, an improved dissuasive arm and a financial arm. The European 
integration would lead to an area that would be economically and politically sustainable. 
This objective cannot be achieved without an effective and credible fiscal framework. 
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